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THE RULE OF LAW AT A CROSSROAD:  ENFORCING 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT THROUGH THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
JENNIFER M. GREEN* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Rape and forced labor as part of the construction of a natural 
gas pipeline project.  Medical experimentation on children without 
their parents’ consent.  Children subjected to both forced labor and 
dangerous working conditions.  Labor organizers killed for their 
attempts to unionize in a mining company.  Over the past decade, 
questions about the role of multinational corporations in human 
rights violations such as these have finally received the world’s 
attention. 
With the globalization of the world economy, the movement to 
hold corporations responsible when they abuse human rights has 
also globalized.  The worldwide communications revolution now 
enables many local activists to publicize human rights abuses 
worldwide and to enlist the support of advocates in the 
corporations’ home states.  International bodies, regional 
organizations, domestic legal systems and corporations themselves 
have made significant progress in developing human rights 
standards to govern corporate conduct.1 
                                                     
*  Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School.  I was formerly 
counsel for the plaintiffs or assisted plaintiffs’ counsel in some of the cases 
mentioned in this article:  Doe v. Karadzic, Doe v. Unocal, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, and Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.  I was also counsel for amici curiae in 
support of plaintiffs in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, Doe v. Exxon, Flomo v. Firestone, Doe v. Nestle, Giraldo v. 
Drummond, and Balintulo v. Daimler, AG, and I submitted an expert declaration 
in support of plaintiffs in Jesner v. Arab Bank.  My thanks to the Journal of 
International Law and the other participants at the outstanding University of 
Pennsylvania symposium on international investment and to Ruth Okediji, Hari 
Osofsky, Beth Stephens, Paul Hoffman and Agnieszka Fryszman for comments on 
this article, to University of Minnesota International Law librarians Mary Rumsey 
and Suzanne Thorpe for their important guidance, and to Soren Lagaard for key 
research assistance.  
1 See, e.g., GLOBAL COMPACT, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 
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The growth of corporate human rights norms was the result of 
increasing pressure for corporations to prevent human rights 
abuses as well as to provide redress for the victims of human rights 
violations they committed.  One factor in the development of the 
norms was pressure from non-governmental organizations around 
the world, including those who brought cases to court to seek the 
enforcement of universally accepted human rights standards. 
Yet even with all of the development of international norms on 
how corporations should behave in the global economy, one of the 
biggest challenges continues to be the enforcement of human rights 
standards—what penalties corporations pay when they violate the 
most fundamental human rights including the prohibitions against 
forced labor, torture, genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, and whether the victims of these abuses can receive any 
compensation.  Effective accountability is critical for an 
international legal system that rewards law-abiding corporations, 
which then contributes to the deterrence of future violations.  The 
outlier corporations committing the violations such as those 
mentioned above have often reacted to human rights lawsuits with 
more than just denial of the charges, but have attempted to 
undermine the very system of accountability. 
My focus here will be one small piece of the attempt to enforce 
human rights standards against corporate violators—the claims 
brought under a U.S. law, the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), and the 
recent challenges presented by a Supreme Court case, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Shell.  One of the central questions the courts have 
begun to address in the wake of the Kiobel decision is to what 
extent the human rights practices of U.S. corporations, or foreign 
corporations doing significant business in this country, “touch and 
concern” the United States.2 
The development of this area of jurisprudence is at an 
important crossroad, and the next steps by U.S. courts will be 
                                                     
2014); Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, 
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014); Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ (last visited Jan. 10, 
2014); BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.business-
humanrights.org/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014); Human Rights Council, Rep. of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 
(Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. 
2 See infra Sections 4 and 5 (discussing the Kiobel decision and post-Kiobel 
cases).   
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critical steps—either forward, towards an improved system of 
accountability for those who suffer the most egregious human 
rights abuses at the hands of corporate violators, or backward, 
leaving victims without a remedy, rewarding those companies 
who flout the rule of law and penalizing their competitors who 
follow the law, and weakening the system of law itself.  I will also 
discuss how the ATS litigation fits into the global movement to 
hold corporations accountable when they violate international 
standards on human rights, the need for consistent human rights 
standards for companies doing business in the United States and 
the importance of a commitment to the rule of law for companies 
operating overseas. 
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE LIABILITY CASES UNDER THE 
ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
The Alien Tort Statute is a provision of the First Judiciary Act 
of 1789, which provided jurisdiction over claims by aliens for 
violations of the “law of nations,”3 today referred to as customary 
international law.  From the early days of the ATS, the statute 
authorized claims against private parties, or “non-state actors,” 
such as pirates, for acts occurring on U.S. and foreign territory.4 
After a few cases in the 1790s, historical accounts note that the 
statute lay dormant for almost 150 years.5  Human rights cases 
under the ATS began in the late 1970s, with a case brought on 
behalf of the family of Joelito Filartiga, a 17-year-old killed by a 
police official because of his father’s political activities.6  In a 
groundbreaking decision, sometimes described as the Brown v. 
Board of Education of international human rights,7 the U.S. Court of 
                                                     
3  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
4  See generally Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (noting that the ATS did not specify types of defendants); William R. Casto, 
The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law 
of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986); William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of 
the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the “Originalists”, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 221 (1996). 
5  See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: 
Inquiries into the Alien Tort Claims Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4-5 nn.15-17 
(counting 21 cases between 1789 and 1980).  Two early cases were Moxon v. The 
Brigantine Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) and Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 
(D.S.C. 1795). 
6  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
7  Harold Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366 
(1991). 
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Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Paraguayan police 
official who had fled to New York could be sued in the state 
because of the universal prohibition against torture and the U.S. 
doctrine of transitory torts, which states that a person cannot 
escape liability by fleeing a particular jurisdiction and can be held 
liable for a tort wherever that person can be found.8 
The Filartiga decision set forth the underlying principle of the 
ATS decisions:  the cases are part of the attempt to enforce 
fundamental human rights:  “a small but important step in the 
fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal 
violence.”9  More than just a rhetorical admonition, however, the 
Second Circuit conducted a careful, scholarly analysis of the role of 
international law in U.S. courts.10   
While the Filartiga family sued the police official who 
physically tortured Joelito Filartiga, cases in the 1980s and 1990s 
held accountable former foreign officials who had command 
responsibility for human rights violations, including both military 
and civilian leaders.  Defendants in these cases include a former 
Argentinian general who presided over a campaign of 
disappearances and extrajudicial executions of political opponents 
during the “dirty war” in 1970s Argentina, former Philippine 
dictator Ferdinand Marcos and former Haitian dictator Prosper 
Avril in two cases alleging human rights violations against political 
opponents, and an Indonesian general who ordered an attack on 
peaceful protestors in East Timor.11 
In 1995, the Second Circuit took an important step in the post-
Filartiga line of cases when it held that a leader of the 1990s Bosnian 
genocide, Radovan Karadzic, could be sued for violations of 
international law, even though Karadzic was a non-state actor (as 
                                                     
8  Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885. 
9  Id. at 890. 
10 Id. at 885; see also McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1843) (discussing 
the longstanding nature of transitory tort doctrine and the reparations obligation 
for civil wrongful acts transcending national boundaries); Stoddard v. Bird, 1 
Kirby 65, 68 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786) (applying transitory tort doctrine by ATS 
author Oliver Ellsworth while a state court judge). 
11  Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (former military 
general responsible for campaign of extrajudicial killings and disappearances 
during Argentina’s dirty war); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights 
Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (former Philippines military dictator); Paul v. 
Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (former Haitian dictator); Todd v. 
Panjaitan, 1994 WL 827111 (D. Mass., Oct. 26, 1994) (former military leader in East 
Timor). 
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the self-proclaimed head of territory not recognized as a state by 
the international community).  The Second Circuit’s holding was 
based on a two-pronged analysis.  First, for wrongs such as torture, 
for which international law requires state action, the state action 
requirement can be satisfied if the defendants are complicit with a 
state actor.  And second, the Court held, there are some 
international law violations whose definition simply does not 
require state action, such as genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.12 
This analysis was applied to multinational corporations in Doe 
v. Unocal, in which plaintiffs sued California-based Unocal and its 
president and chief executive officer for human rights violations 
committed in connection with a natural gas pipeline project in 
Burma.  In 1997, the Central District of California adopted the Kadic 
two-pronged analysis, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed with their 
claims of forced labor, rape and other human rights abuses.13  The 
court held that the forced labor claims, as a form of slavery, were 
claims for which the international law definition did not require 
any state action, and that, for claims such as rape as form of 
torture, the state action element was met by the plaintiffs’ 
allegation of Unocal’s complicity with the military government of 
Burma.14  The case was resolved in a confidential settlement in 
2004.15 
Cases against corporations were highly contested.  To survive 
motions to dismiss, litigants had to survive numerous hurdles, 
such as showing that the case was brought in the most convenient 
forum and should not be transferred to a foreign court (forum non 
conveniens doctrine),16 the case did not present questions that were 
                                                     
12  Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1995). 
13  Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also John Doe I 
v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 
(9th Cir. 2002), on reh’g en banc sub nom. 
14  Id. The court followed the careful analysis of Kadic in analyzing what 
norms could constitute customary international law, citing U.S. v. Smith and 
Paquete Habana. 
15 See Historic Advance for Universal Human Rights: Unocal to Compensate 
Burmese Villagers, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., 
http://www.ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/historic-advance-
universal-human-rights%3A-unocal-compensate-burmese-villagers (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2014) (announcing the settlement in which Unocal agreed to compensate 
Burmese plaintiffs who sued the firm for complicity in human rights abuses). 
16  See, e.g., Turedi v. Coca-Cola Co., 460 F.Supp.2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(holding that the Court had jurisdiction to dismiss the suit on the basis of forum 
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more appropriately decided by the executive or legislative 
branches of government (political question doctrine),17 or that the 
case did not challenge the legitimate act of a foreign government 
(act of state doctrine).18 
Most importantly, the cases that survived motions to dismiss 
were those in which the plaintiffs could show a strong link 
between the defendants and the alleged human rights violations.  It 
was never sufficient, in any court, for a plaintiff to argue that a 
corporation was merely doing business in a country in which 
human rights violations were occurring:  the standard required 
that the company must be complicit in those violations.  This 
complicity took the form of either direct participation or the well-
recognized forms of secondary liability such as conspiracy, agency, 
alter-ego, and aiding and abetting liability, with the most 
commonly accepted (and historically substantiated) standard for 
aiding and abetting liability being that the defendant knowingly 
provided substantial assistance for the commission of the alleged 
human rights violations.19 
Plaintiffs alleged direct participation in human rights violations 
in Abdullahi v. Pfizer,20 in which family members of Nigerian 
children alleged that the Pfizer company had direct liability for the 
company’s medical experimentation on the children without their 
parents’ consent, and that as a result, eleven children died and 
many others were left blind, deaf, paralyzed or brain-damaged.  
The initial ATS litigation raised awareness about the issue, and the 
Nigerian government then took action, leading to a settlement for 
                                                     
non conveniens).   
17  See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d 232, supra note 12 (finding that adjudication of this 
case was not precluded by the political question doctrine). 
18  See, e.g., Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 893, 899 (holding that the act of state 
doctrine did not did not preclude consideration of claims based on alleged human 
rights abuses by the Burmese government but that the doctrine did preclude 
claims based on expropriation of property in Myanmar by the Burmese 
government).  
19  Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) vacated sub nom.; 
Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 10-56739, 2013 WL 6670945 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 2013); cf. 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) judgment entered sub nom.; Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. 
Talisman Energy, Inc., 01 CIV.9882(DLC), 2006 WL 3469542 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2006) 
and aff’d, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing different standards for aiding 
and abetting liability—mens rea of purpose rather than knowledge). 
20  Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that 
medical experimentation without consent violated customary international law, 
including standards established at Nuremberg war crimes tribunals). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/6
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the children and family members affected.21  The case also 
exemplifies another benefit of ATS litigation, in which the cases 
contribute to the development of norms that will help prevent 
violations, in this case, the norm against medical experimentation 
without consent.22 
A number of cases against U.S. military contractors for abuses 
in Iraq that include extrajudicial killing and torture have survived 
defendants’ motions to dismiss and have settled.  For example, a 
series of cases were brought against Blackwater for beatings and 
shootings, including launching a grenade into a girls’ school and a 
massacre which left seventeen Iraqi civilians dead and more than 
twenty injured; the case settled in 2010.23  The cases against U.S. 
contractors have highlighted these abuses and helped develop 
norms both in the United States and led to international action.24 
In some cases, plaintiffs alleged both direct and secondary 
                                                     
21  In 2009, Pfizer reached a $75 million settlement with the state of Kano in 
Nigeria.  Nicole Perlroth, Pfizer Finalizing Settlement in Nigerian Drug Suit, FORBES, 
Apr. 3, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/03/pfizer-kano-trovan-business-
healthcare-settlement.html.  The civil case resulted in a confidential settlement in 
February 2011.  Donald G. McNeil Jr., Nigerians Receive First Payments for Children 
Who Died in 1996 Meningitis Drug Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/world/africa/12nigeria.html. 
22  According to one scholar, the Abdullahi ruling “should help persuade 
international corporations and researchers alike to take informed consent . . . 
much more seriously.”  George J. Annas, Globalized Clinical Trials and Informed 
Consent, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2050, 2053 (2009).  See also Danielle Cendrowski, 
International Health Law Violations Under the Alien Tort Statute: Federal Appeals Court 
Reinstated Lawsuit Under the Alien Tort Statute Against United States Pharmaceutical 
Company Pfizer Brought by Nigerian Children and Their Guardians-Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 
Inc., 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 233, 236 (2009) (concluding that as a result of Abdullahi, 
“pharmaceutical and health care companies must be more cognizant of their 
actions in foreign countries that may give rise to potential claims under ATS for 
violations of other norms of customary international health law”). 
23  See In re XE Serv. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F.Supp.2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2009) 
(denying motion to dismiss); In re XE Serv. Alien Tort Litig., Nos. 09-615, 09-616, 
09-617, 09-618, 09-645, 09-1017, and 09-1048 (E.D. Va. Jan. 6, 2010) (order of 
stipulated dismissal); see also Jarallah v. Xe, No. 09-631, 2009 WL 1350958 (S.D. Cal. 
filed Mar. 27, 2009) (discussing a schoolteacher killed by Xe-Blackwater shooters 
in Iraq; this case was transferred and consolidated with In re XE Serv). 
24  See U.S. DEP’T. OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 3020.50 CHANGE 1, Aug. 1, 2011, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/p_vault/DODI_302050_01Aug2011.pdf, for 
U.S. security contractor norms; see the International Code of Conduct for Private 
Security Service Providers (ICoC) organization, http://www.icoc-psp.org/, for 
international efforts; see generally Daniel Warner, Establishing Norms for Private 
Military and Security Companies, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 106 (2012); Private 
Security Companies (PSCs) - Program Support, U.S. DEP’T. OF DEFENSE, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/psc.html. 
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liability.  One such case was Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., in 
which plaintiffs alleged that the parent and subsidiary 
corporations and the head of the Shell Nigeria subsidiary were 
directly liable because corporate employees bribed witnesses to 
give false testimony against Ken Saro-Wiwa, a leader of the 
movement against Shell’s exploitation of the environment, and 
repressed activists in the Ogoni region of Nigeria.25  The plaintiffs 
also brought indirect liability claims that Shell aided and abetted 
abuses against plaintiffs. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs and 
their family members were “repeatedly arrested, detained and 
tortured,” executed after a trial based on “fabricated evidence,” 
and that, although “these abuses were carried out by the Nigerian 
government and military, they were instigated, orchestrated, 
planned, and facilitated by Shell Nigeria under the direction of the 
defendants.”26  The court rejected defendants’ motion to dismiss 
and found sufficient allegations of defendants’ direct participation 
in the human rights violations.27 The case settled in 2009.28 
In Doe v. Exxon, Indonesian villagers alleged that the Exxon 
Mobil Corporation, as part of a natural gas extraction and 
processing facility in the Aceh province of Indonesia, directed 
security forces who committed abuses, including killings and 
torture, which were actionable under the ATS.29  Both the Court of 
Appeals and the District Court for the District of Columbia rejected 
defendants’ claims that plaintiffs had not made sufficient 
allegations of corporate complicity in the violations, instead 
accepting claims that Exxon paid, supported, equipped, trained the 
soldiers and provided intelligence to the military,30 and that the 
U.S. parent was involved as well as the subsidiary.31 
                                                     
25  Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96-8386, 2002 WL 319887, at *2, 
9, 25 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002). 
26  Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000). 
27  Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887 at *12–13. 
28  Jad Mouawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 8, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/business/global/09shell.html. 
29  Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated on other 
grounds, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
30  Id. at 16. 
31  Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19–20 (D.D.C. 2008) (Exxon 
Mobil Indonesia (EMOI) “alone was not ‘equipped to handle all the issues that 
were cropping up’ with security and therefore ‘went up the chain and request[ed] 
additional corporate kinds of support’ from Exxon Mobil Corporation—which 
enforced ‘uncompromising controls’ over EMOI’s security.”). 
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In March 2007, Chiquita Brands International pled guilty to the 
felony of knowingly providing material support to the Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia (AUC), a paramilitary organization that it knew 
to be responsible for killings and other crimes against Colombian 
civilians and designated a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” and a 
“Specially Designated Global Terrorist” by the U.S. Government.32  
The U.S. described Chiquita’s support for seven years of over 100 
payments to the AUC as “prolonged, steady, and substantial” in 
the Sentencing Memorandum submitted to the District Court and 
found, after a full investigation, that “Chiquita’s money helped buy 
weapons and ammunition used to kill innocent victims.”33  After 
pleading guilty, Chiquita was fined $25 million for violating U.S. 
antiterrorism laws.34  In the related civil ATS case, In re Chiquita 
Brands, each plaintiff alleged that the Chiquita-supported AUC 
terrorist organization attacked his or her relative in Colombia.35  
One decedent was reported to have been kidnapped when he was 
asleep at home, and then beaten, shot twice, and left for dead.36  
The Court found that the facts alleged by plaintiffs in this case 
were sufficient to make plausible ATS claims for torture, 
extrajudicial killing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.37 
In the midst of this developing case law, the Supreme Court 
weighed in for the first time in 2004 in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.38  In 
the Sosa decision, the Court upheld the Filartiga line of cases and 
held that plaintiffs could bring claims for torts that were also 
violations of widely accepted, clearly defined customary 
international law norms.39  The Executive Branch submitted an 
amicus curiae brief arguing that the ATS should not apply to 
                                                     
32   U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to Making 
Payments to a Designated Terrorist Organization and Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine 
(Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/March/07_nsd_161.html. 
33  Sentencing Memorandum by the United States, United States v. Chiquita 
Brands Int’l, Inc., No. 07-055 (D.D.C.  2007) (filed Sept. 17, 2007) [hereinafter 
Sentencing Memorandum]. 
34  Colombians Sue Chiquita over Paramilitary Payments, CNN, June 1, 2011, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/05/31/colombia.chiquita.laws
uits/.   
35  In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute & S’holder Derivative 
Litig., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1307–08 (S.D. Fla. 2011).  
36  Id. at 1308. 
37  Id. at 1359. 
38  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004). 
39  Id. at 724–25 (noting standard generally consistent with Filartiga and 
Marcos). 
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conduct that occurs on foreign soil, but the Court did not address 
that issue.40  Although the case was against an individual foreign 
citizen and did not concern corporate liability, various amici 
representing trade organizations filed briefs which sought to 
eliminate corporate ATS liability, arguing that the cases disrupted 
U.S. trade and foreign policy.41  This effort failed, as the Court 
chose not to address the question of corporate liability.42 
3. THE ATS AS PART OF THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT FOR CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
As the ATS litigation against corporate defendants developed, 
so also did the global movement for corporate social responsibility, 
which included providing remedies for human rights victims.  
Opponents have sometimes complained that ATS cases were a 
form of “legal imperialism” or that U.S. corporations would be 
singled out and lose business to foreign, less ethical, competitors.43  
However, the ATS is just one part of the developing 
interdependent system for corporate accountability for human 
rights abuses. 
Many of the cases discussed above came from and were 
connected to social movements against human rights abuses, such 
as the torture and extrajudicial killing of people because of their 
political beliefs and advocacy on issues such as fair labor standards 
or a healthy environment.  The ATS cases reflected developments 
in other countries and in international and regional systems.  
International standards, in turn, recognizing the importance of 
judicial enforcement mechanisms, incorporated civil litigation 
against corporations as an important tool in the implementation of 
the developing norms.  For example, the most recent international 
set of standards, the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on human rights 
and transnational businesses, outlined a framework to protect and 
respect human rights and provide access to a remedy for 
violations.  These principles stated that:  “Effective judicial 
                                                     
40  Brief of the United States for Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 46-50, 
Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339, 2004 WL 425376); see also Doe I, et al., Plaintiffs, v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., et al., Defendant., 2003 WL 25625348 (D.D.C.). 
41  See, e.g., Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Reversal, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339, 2004 WL 199236). 
42  See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. 692. 
43  See, e.g., Joseph G. Finnerty III and John Merrigan, Legal Imperialism, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 28, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB117263453724421692. 
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mechanisms are at the core of ensuring access to remedy.”44  This 
of course builds on the international law norms for the right to a 
remedy.45   
The Guiding Principles also noted that “States should ensure 
that they do not erect barriers to prevent legitimate cases from 
being brought before the courts where judicial recourse is an 
essential part of accessing remedy or alternative sources of 
effective remedy are unavailable.”46  The increasing availability of 
remedies for survivors of human rights violations is an important 
step toward giving meaning to these guidelines. 
Important standards have also developed at the international 
regional level.  One recent example of critical regional action 
leading to greater corporate accountability is the 2001 Brussels 
regulation on jurisdiction, which requires courts in European 
nations to assert jurisdiction over corporations domiciled in 
European Union countries.47 
In addition, other national governments have implemented 
standards and put corporations on trial for human rights abuses.  
As noted by Judge Richard Posner in his opinion in Flomo v. 
Firestone, corporate tort liability is common around the world.48 
 Just a few recent examples of national laws and court cases 
span the globe.  In England, a recent legislative change allowed 
foreign direct liability:  if the parent company is directly involved 
in the subsidiary’s operation or exercises de facto control over 
those operations, it owes a duty of care to employees and anyone 
affected by the operations.49  Cases in England have resulted in 
                                                     
44  Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at Annex ¶ 26. 
45  Factory at Chrozow (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)  No. 17, at 29 
(Sept. 13) (holding “[i]t is a principle of international law, and even a general 
conception of law, that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to 
make reparation in an adequate form.”); Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess. 
Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. 
No. 10 (2010); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 
I.C. J. 3, 33 (Feb. 5) (noting “[r]esponsibility is the necessary corollary of a right.”). 
46  Guiding Principles, supra note 1, ¶ 26. 
47  Council Regulation 44/2001, On Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 




48 Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 
2011) (citing Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective, 31 
LEGAL STUD. 684 (2011)). 
49  Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 1159 (U.K.), available at 
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numerous successful verdicts and settlements for the plaintiffs,50 as 
have cases in Australia,51  Argentina,52 Colombia,53 and Ghana.54  
Some countries have laws providing for a forum of necessity – 
plaintiffs may bring the claims in their domestic courts if there is 
no other forum where plaintiffs could reasonably seek relief.  A 
growing number of countries also allow for the possibility of 
corporate criminal liability.55 
                                                     
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf. 
50 See, e.g., Chandler v. Cape PLC, No. [2012] EWCA Civ 525, England and 
Wales App. (concerning a worker exposed to asbestos in an extinct subsidiary 
company who was able to recover from the parent company); Guerrero v. 
Monterrico, EWHC 3228 (Q.B.) (2010) (concerning 33 Peruvians protesting copper 
mine; the plaintiffs charged corporate complicity in torture and the case ended in 
confidential settlement); Landmark Settlement of Miners’ Claims Boosts Fight for 
Silicosis Compensation, LEIGH DAY, Sept. 25, 2013, 
http://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2013/September-2013/Landmark-
settlement-of-miners%E2%80%99-claims-boosts-fight (discussing a settlement by 
a mining company to pay South African workers who contracted silicosis).   
51  BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, CASE PROFILE: BHP LAWSUIT (RE 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA), http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/ 
Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/LawsuitsSelectedcases/BHPlawsuitrePapuaNewGuine
a (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).  Sued in Australia, the mining company BHP was 
required to pay AUS$40 million and remove mine tailings from a polluted river in 
Papua New Guinea. 
52  Argentina: Court Halts Open-Pit Uranium Mine, NUCLEAR MONITOR (WISE), 
May 12, 2010, http://www.nirs.org/mononline/nm709.pdf; Court Halts Open-Pit 
Mining in Northern Argentina, LATIN AMERICAN HERALD TRIB., Feb. 2011, 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=355944& CategoryId=14093. The 
Argentinean Supreme Court halted open pit uranium mining until a transnational 
company could show that work would not cause contamination or environmental 
damage. 
53  Claudia Müller-Hoff, Making Corporations Respond to the Damage They 
Cause: Strategic Approaches to Compensation and Corporate Accountability, EUROPEAN 
CTR. FOR CONST. & HUM. RTS. (ECCHR) 5, available at 
http://www.ecchr.de/?file=tl_files/Dokumente/Publikationen/Making%20resp
ond%202012-11.pdf.  The Colombian Constitutional Court stopped Muriel Mining 
Corporation’s project in areas owned by indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
communities. 
54  Müller-Hoff, supra note 53, at 5.  The High Court of Ghana granted 
compensation to victims of forced displacement by Anglogold Ashanti at the 
Iduapriem Mine in Ghana. 
55  Examples include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, India, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, United Kingdom, and 
the United States.  See Anita Ramasastry and Robert C. Thompson, COMMERCE, 
CRIME AND CONFLICT:  LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE 
BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of 
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The Alien Tort Statute has been an important tool for victims of 
corporate human rights abuses to obtain some redress, particularly 
when there is a U.S. corporation involved, and it is an important 
part of a growing system of consistent, enforceable corporate 
human rights standards to provide victims redress, punish 
violators and prevent continued abuses.  International standards 
such as the Guiding Principles suggest that courts or other 
segments of the U.S. governments shall not “erect barriers to 
prevent legitimate cases from being brought to court.”56  In 2011, 
however, a new challenge arose for victims seeking to sue 
corporations under the ATS.     
4. KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH:  A CORPORATE ATS CASE AT THE 
SUPREME COURT 
In 2011, the ATS again reached the U.S. Supreme Court, this 
time in a case against a corporate defendant. 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum was filed in 2002 by twelve 
Nigerians who sued Royal Dutch Petroleum and Shell Transport 
and Trading (Shell) for torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and 
crimes against humanity during the mid-1990s, charging Shell with 
complicity with the military dictatorship in Nigeria.57  Because of 
this treatment, they had sought and been granted political asylum 
in the United States.58  In 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, without prior briefing or argument on the issue, 
ruled that corporations could not be sued under the ATS.59 
Three subsequent courts of appeals—the Seventh Circuit, the 
D.C. Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit—ruled that the ATS permits 
suits against corporations for universally condemned human rights 
violations (and rulings by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit have been interpreted to stand for the principle of corporate 
accountability under the ATS.).60 
                                                     
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1493-1500; see also Flomo, 643 
F.3d at 1018-20. 
56  Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at Annex ¶ 26. 
57  The Kiobel case was originally a companion case to Wiwa, discussed earlier, 
but the two cases were separated after dismissal of one of the claims in Kiobel led 
to an interlocutory appeal.  While the Kiobel appeal was pending, Wiwa settled.  
See Mouawad, supra note 28.  
58   Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013). 
59   Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 
S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
60  Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012); Aziz v. Alcolac, 
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The Supreme Court granted the Kiobel plaintiffs’ petition for 
certiorari on the question of corporate liability under the ATS.  The 
case was highly contested:  19 amicus briefs were submitted in 
support of the Kiobel plaintiffs (Petitioners) and 16 amicus briefs 
were submitted in support of the Shell defendants (Respondents). 
A broad range of briefs submitted in support of Petitioners 
included briefs by survivors of human rights violations, scholars, a 
former U.S. senator, former military officials, former U.S. 
counterterrorism officials, former U.S. diplomats, United Nations 
officials, a Nobel-prize winning economist, and German Members 
of Parliament.    Respondents’ amici included a number of 
corporations and corporate trade organizations, selected 
governments, as well as scholars.61 
In their briefs, Respondents and many of their supporting amici 
aimed to eliminate corporate ATS liability altogether.62  In 
commenting on this strategy, the United Nations Special 
Representative on Human Rights and Business, Harvard Professor 
John Ruggie, asked, “Should the litigation strategy aim to destroy 
an entire juridical edifice for redressing gross violations of human 
rights, particularly where other legal grounds exist to protect the 
company’s interests?”63 
Another question was how the Court would rule so soon after 
its ruling in Citizens United granting corporations first amendment 
rights64—if corporations had these types of rights, did they also 
have responsibilities to comply with human rights standards?65 
                                                     
Inc., 658 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 
2011); Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1013; Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 
2007), on reh’g en banc, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008). 
61  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1659.  For a compilation of all briefs filed in the case, 
see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: SCOTUSblog Coverage, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/ 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2014) [hereinafter SCOTUSblog].     
62  See SCOTUSblog, supra note 61 (including Brief for Respondents Kiobel, 133 
S. Ct. (No. 10-1491));  Brief for BP America et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Kiobel, 133  S. Ct. (No. 10-1491);  Brief for Chevron Corp. et al., as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Kiobel, 133  S. Ct. (No. 10-1491)); Brief for 
KBR, Inc. et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Kiobel, 133  S. Ct. (No. 
10-1491); Brief for Rio Tinto Grp. & Occidental Petroleum Corp., as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Kiobel, 133  S. Ct. (No. 10-1491).  
63  John G. Ruggie, Issues Brief, Kiobel and Corporate Social Responsibility, 
HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., Sept. 4, 2012, at 6. 
64  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
65  See Beth Stephens, Are Corporations People?  Corporate Personhood Under the 
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After argument, the Court took the unusual step of ordering 
briefing on a separate issue:  “whether and under what 
circumstances the [Alien Tort Statute] allows courts to recognize a 
cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within 
the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”66 
That question was briefed; again, multiple amici weighed in.  In 
April 2013, the Court issued its decision.  The attempt to eliminate 
corporate liability under the ATS failed.  Instead, the Court 
introduced a new standard for ATS cases, based on the “principles 
underlying the canon of interpretation” of a presumption against 
the extraterritorial application of “an Act of Congress regulating 
conduct.”67 
Chief Justice Roberts rejected the application of the transitory 
tort doctrine to ATS cases and devoted much of the majority 
opinion to a discussion of concerns about the foreign policy 
implications that arise when courts decide cases involving acts 
which occurred on foreign soil (to explain why it invoked the 
“principles underlying the canon” on extraterritoriality, since the 
canon on extraterritoriality itself had not been applied to statutes 
such as the ATS, which the Court’s earlier decision in Sosa v. 
Alvarez Machain, had ruled to be jurisdictional).68  Notably, the 
majority did not overrule Sosa, which allowed a foreign plaintiff to 
sue for acts on foreign soil.69 
The majority opinion and the three separate concurring 
opinions raised a number of questions which continue to be 
litigated.  In Part IV of its decision, the majority applied its 
                                                     
Constitution and International Law, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2013) (comparing the 
reasoning of the Citizens United and Kiobel courts); see also Harold Hongju Koh, 
Separating Myth from Reality About Corporate Responsibility Litigation, 7 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 263, 265 (2004) (“If corporations have rights under international law, by 
parity of reasoning, they must have duties as well.”). 
66  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.  For the text of the grant of certiorari, see Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). 
67  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.  The court referred to the “canon of 
interpretation” because, as it specified, the presumption itself was limited such 
that the extraterritorial application was not a question of jurisdiction but rather 
was a “merits question.”  Id. (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. 
Ct. 2869, 2876–77 (2010)). 
68  Id. at 1663–69. 
69  Id. at 1663 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714, 724 (2004)) 
(“[T]he First Congress did not intend the provision to be ‘stillborn.’  The grant of 
jurisdiction is instead ‘best read as having been enacted on the understanding that 
the common law would provide a cause of action for [a] modest number of 
international law violations.’”). 
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extraterritoriality test to the Kiobel plaintiffs’ allegations and issued 
its narrow conclusion:  “On these facts, all the relevant conduct 
took place outside the United States.”70  The Court then broadened 
its analysis with the following:  “And even where the claims touch 
and concern the territory of the United States they must do so with 
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application.  Corporations are often present in many countries, and 
it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence 
suffices.”71 
This short paragraph has prompted many questions from 
courts, plaintiffs, defendants, and scholars, including what conduct 
is sufficient to “touch and concern” the United States “with 
sufficient force” to allow claims, and what “mere corporate 
presence” is insufficient to allow a claim to proceed.72 
Contributing to the debate, Justice Kennedy joined the majority 
opinion but also wrote a separate opinion noting that the Court 
was “careful to leave open a number of significant questions 
regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute.”73  
Justice Kennedy indicated that some (unspecified) claims may 
proceed under the ATS: 
[C]ases may arise with allegations of serious violations of 
international law principles protecting persons, cases 
covered neither by the [Torture Victim Protection Act] nor 
by the reasoning and holding of today’s case; and in those 
disputes the proper implementation of the presumption 
against extraterritorial application may require some 
further elaboration and explanation.74 
A concurrence by Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, 
offered further indication that the Kiobel decision did not eliminate 
the ATS as an avenue for plaintiffs to seek redress for claims where 
conduct occurred overseas.75  Justice Alito stated that he wrote 
                                                     
70  Id. at 1669. 
71  Id. (citation omitted). 
72 See, e.g., An Hertogen, Kiobel Insta-Symposium Insta-Roundup, OPINIO JURIS 
(Apr. 18, 2013, 5:36 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/18/kiobel-insta-
symposium-insta-roundup/ (aggregating all of the site’s posts by academics 
regarding the Kiobel decision); SCOTUSblog, supra note 61 (providing links to 
several commentaries on the Kiobel decision). 
73  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
74  Id.  
75  Id. at 1669–70 (Alito, J., concurring).  
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separately to “set out the broader standard . . . that this case falls 
within the scope of the presumption.”76  That “broader standard,” 
which he and Justice Thomas preferred, would have required that 
an ATS claim be barred “unless the domestic conduct is sufficient 
to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s 
requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized 
nations.”77 
Justice Breyer wrote yet another concurring opinion which also 
noted that the majority opinion left many issues unresolved.  
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, this opinion 
noted that the ATS basic purpose is to provide compensation for 
victims of “today’s pirates” (meaning both those committing acts 
of piracy as well as other universally condemned human rights 
abuses) and that other countries permitted plaintiffs to sue for 
human rights violations.78  This concurrence suggested that these 
justices would displace the Kiobel majority’s “presumption” where 
“the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an 
important American national interest, and that includes a distinct 
interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe 
harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or 
other common enemy of mankind.”79 
The question of which claims may proceed under the Kiobel 
standard is still being sorted out by the lower courts, and litigation 
on these questions is expected for the next several years. 
5. THE INITIAL ROUND OF POST-KIOBEL CASES 
An initial series of cases, almost all by district courts, quickly 
dismissed plaintiffs’ claims based on the doctrine of 
extraterritoriality.  Some provided little or no analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion; in others, the analysis misstated the facts 
or treated Justice Alito’s “broader” test on extraterritoriality as if it 
were the majority opinion.  In a more recent series of decisions, the 
courts have expanded their analysis of the Kiobel opinion and 
begun to analyze the majority’s “touch and concern” test.  These 
latter cases have led to decisions which have emphasized the 
importance of accountability for human rights violations. 
                                                     
76  Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
77  Id.  
78  Id. at 1671–72 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
79  Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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For example, in June 2013, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia dismissed plaintiffs’ claims in Al 
Shimari v. CACI International.  The case was brought by four Iraqi 
civilians against a U.S. contractor for torture, war crimes, and 
inhuman treatment in the notorious Abu Ghraib prison under U.S. 
control.80  The plaintiffs alleged that CACI employees directed 
soldiers in torture and mistreatment including the use of 
unmuzzled dogs and beatings81 and that the corporation ignored 
reports of abuse, praised or promoted employees implicated in the 
abuse, and attempted to cover up the misconduct in order to 
continue its contract.82  The court stated that it dismissed the claims 
because the “tort claims occurred exclusively in Iraq, a foreign 
sovereign.”83 
The Al Shimari opinion mistakenly read Kiobel as a blanket 
prohibition and erred in its broad statement that “Kiobel rejected 
the extraterritorial application of the ATS.”84  As explained above, 
such a categorical bar was the position of the self-described 
“broader” test proposed by Justice Alito in his concurring opinion 
(joined only by Justice Thomas), rather than the Kiobel majority.85  
The Al Shimari court failed to apply the “touch and concern” 
analysis of the majority opinion, which requires an assessment of 
the U.S. interests at stake:  in Al Shimari, a U.S. corporation (making 
decisions in the United States) violated a norm that the U.S. has 
espoused (the prohibition against torture) in a facility controlled by 
the United States.  The Al Shimari opinion even acknowledged that 
the Kiobel decision “may be interpreted by some as leaving the 
proverbial door ajar for courts to eventually measure its width.”86  
However, among other errors, the District Court interpreted the 
Kiobel “presumption” as “only rebuttable by legislative act,” a 
standard which the Supreme Court itself did not articulate.87    
Plaintiffs have appealed that case to the Fourth Circuit, supported 
                                                     
80  Complaint, Al Shimari v. CACI, Int’l. Inc., 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 
2:08-cv-637), available at http://ccrjustice.org/Al-Shimari-v-CACI. 
81  Id. ¶¶ 18, 81–83, 87–88, 103, 116, 119–25. 
82  Id. ¶¶ 146, 148, 149, 152, 157. 
83  Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857, 858 (E.D. Va. 2013). 
84  Id. at 864. 
85  For a discussion of Alito’s concurrence in Kiobel, see supra notes 75–77 and 
accompanying text.  
86  Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 867. 
87   Id. at 866. 
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by a number of amici curiae.88 
In July 2013, a district court in Alabama dismissed a case 
against Drummond, a mining company based in Alabama.89  
There, the plaintiffs had alleged that the head of Drummond took 
actions in Alabama that involved funding terrorists in Colombia 
who murdered union activists.90  In its ruling on defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment of the case, the court ruled that 
there was no admissible evidence that the U.S.-based Drummond 
corporation made decisions in the United States.91  Plaintiffs have 
challenged the court’s analysis including the exclusion of evidence 
and appealed to the Eleventh Circuit;  as of this writing, both 
argument and a decision are pending.92 
In a case against three U.S. corporations for aiding and abetting 
South Africa’s apartheid regime, plaintiffs alleged that IBM, Ford, 
and Daimler supplied computers for the main mechanisms 
supporting apartheid—for the pass system, to track dissidents, and 
to target particular individuals for repressive acts—and supplied 
vehicles for the police and military used to commit human rights 
                                                     
88 See Al-Shimari v. CACI et al., CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., http://ccrjustice.org/Al-
Shimari-v-CACI (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (providing links to all amicus briefs 
supporting the plaintiffs).  As this article was going to press, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit unanimously reversed the lower court’s dismissal.  
The Circuit held that the lower court had misread the Kiobel decision, and should 
have considered CACI’s substantial U.S. connections. Al-Shimari v. CACI Premier 
Technology, Inc., No. 13-1937 (4th Cir. June 30, 2014).  
89 Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960, at 
*9–*10 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 2013).   
90 Id. at *2–*3. 
91 Id. at *8. 
92 There are other cases which dismiss plaintiffs’ claims based on Justice 
Alito’s concurrence rather than the majority opinion.  For one example, see 
Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794 (KMW), 2013 WL 4564646, at *2 n.4 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013) (“Although the majority failed to adopt a particular test 
regarding the ‘touch and concern’ standard, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ claim 
would fail under either formulation proposed by the concurring opinions.”).  The 
Tymoshenko court fails to note that both the Alito and Breyer concurrences state 
that they are advocating different standards than the majority, and Justice Alito 
notes that his standard is “broader.”  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. 
Ct. 1659, 1670 (2013) (Alito, J., concurring).  A second case invoking the blanket 
standard advocated by Justice Alito’s concurrence is Muntslag v. D’Ieteren, SA., 
No. 12-cv-07038 (TPG), 2013 WL 2150686, *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2013) (misstating 
the holding of the court and instead asserting a standard more along the lines of 
Justice Alito’s opinion: “The court held that the ATS does not provide the federal 
courts of the United States with subject matter jurisdiction over torts that occur 
outside of the United States.”). 
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violations.93  The case was before the Second Circuit on a writ of 
mandamus and the collateral order doctrine, but the court 
sidestepped the limited procedural posture and instead wrote a 
substantive opinion about Kiobel.94  The August 2013 opinion did 
not consider the actions that plaintiffs alleged had occurred on U.S. 
territory, including defendants’ affirmative steps in the United 
States to circumvent the domestic and international sanctions 
regime which barred all sales of commodities to apartheid security 
forces and the provision of technical data for use by apartheid 
security forces.95  Instead, once again, the court applied the 
standard set forth in the concurrence by Justice Alito.96  After the 
Second Circuit’s remand, the District Court ordered briefing on 
whether corporations are liable under the Alien Tort Statute.97 
More recently, however, there have been a number of 
significant post-Kiobel rulings that have allowed plaintiffs to 
proceed with their claims.  An April 17, 2014 decision in the 
Apartheid case held that corporations can be liable under the ATS, 
and allowed plaintiffs to make a preliminary showing to satisfy the 
Kiobel test on extraterritoriality.98 
In another case with a corporate defendant, Doe v. Nestle, 
brought on behalf of child labor victims in the Ivory Coast, a 
December 2013 Ninth Circuit decision reversed the district court’s 
pre-Kiobel dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims.99  The Circuit held that 
the question of whether the alleged acts “touch and concern” the 
United States was a question of fact and remanded the case to 
allow plaintiffs to amend the complaint to deal with this 
question.100  On the question of corporate liability, the court cited 
Kiobel as “suggesting in dicta that corporations may be held liable 
under the ATS,” and further cited the analyses in three cases, 
including a prior Ninth Circuit ruling, which provided lengthy and 
scholarly analyses of corporate liability under the ATS:  Sarei v. Rio 
                                                     
93 Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 182–83 (2d Cir. 2013). 
94  Id. at 188–91. 
95  Id. at 193–94. 
96  Id. at 191 n.26, 191–93. 
97  Order, In re South African Apartheid Litigation, No. 1:02-md-01499-SAS 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2013). 
98   In Re: Apartheid Litigation, No. 1:02-md-01499 -SAS (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 
2014). 
99  Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013). 
100  Id. 
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Tinto, Doe v. Exxon and Flomo v. Firestone.101  The Nestle court 
reversed the lower court’s requirement that the plaintiffs allege 
specific intent for the applicable mens rea standard, and instead 
held that the test was whether defendants had provided assistance 
that had a substantial effect on the commission of the human rights 
violations.102 
In a case with an organization as a defendant, Mwani v. Bin 
Laden and Al Qaeda, plaintiffs alleged harm resulting from 
defendants’ 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya.103  The 
judge noted that he requested briefing from both parties because 
the “case is between foreign nationals and a foreign group for 
events that occurred in Nairobi, Kenya.”104  The District Court for 
the District of Colombia rejected defendants’ motion to dismiss the 
case based on the Kiobel ruling on extraterritoriality.105  The court 
noted that the Kiobel decision had left open a “narrow[] avenue for 
jurisdiction over acts that occurred outside the United States.”106  It 
focused on the majority’s analysis of the Kiobel plaintiffs’ 
allegations, interpreting the opinion as “suggesting that in some 
limited instances, an act occurring outside the United States could 
so obviously touch and concern the territory of the United States 
that the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS 
is displaced.”107  The Mwani court highlighted plaintiffs’ allegations 
that the foreign defendant took overt acts in furtherance of 
conspiracy in the United States, and that U.S. national interests 
were involved because the acts “were directed at the United States 
government, with the intention of harming this country and its 
                                                     
101  Id. (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 
(2013); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (same), vacated 
on other grounds, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Flomo v. Firestone Nat’l Rubber 
Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1020–21  (7th Cir. 2011) (same); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 
F.3d 736, 761 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that corporations may be liable 
under ATS), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1995. 
102  Nestle, 738 F.3d at 1049 (rejecting Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. 
Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009) and endorsing the 
standards set forth in Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-01-A, 
Judgment, ¶ 475 (Special Court of Sierra Leone Sept. 26, 2013) and Prosecutor v. 
Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶ 36, n.97, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013)). 
103  Mwani v. Bin Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013). 
104   Id. at 3. 
105   Id. at 5–6.  
106   Id. at 4. 
107   Id.  
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citizens.”108  The Mwani decision is now on appeal. 
One detailed analysis of the question of extraterritoriality 
occurred in a case against a man living in Massachusetts, Sexual 
Minorities of Uganda v. Scott Lively.109  The defendant in this case 
was alleged to have planned and managed a decade-long 
campaign to cause physical harm to the LGBT community in 
Uganda.  The judge found that the level of persecution amounted 
to a crime against humanity.110  In analyzing the Kiobel 
extraterritoriality “principles,” the judge highlighted that Lively 
was a U.S. citizen, that his campaign against the Ugandan LGBT 
community was conducted “to a substantial degree within the 
United States”;111 and the court highlighted the defendant’s 
nationality and location in concluding that “[a]n exercise of 
jurisdiction under the ATS over claims against an American citizen 
who has allegedly violated the law of nations in large part through 
actions committed within this country fits comfortably within the 
limits described in Kiobel.”112 
The analysis of the defendant’s ties to the United States is also 
appropriate for cases against U.S. corporations:  U.S. corporations 
are citizens of the United States and conduct “substantial” portions 
of their activity in the United States. 
The Sexual Minorities Uganda decision also concluded that to 
hold the defendant accountable would produce no negative foreign 
policy implication; to the contrary, there might in fact be negative 
foreign policy concerns if the defendant were to face no 
consequences for his actions: 
Indeed, the failure of the United States to make its courts 
available for claims against its citizens for actions taken 
within this country that injure persons abroad would itself 
create the potential for just the sort of foreign policy 
complications that the limitations on federal common law 
are aimed at avoiding.  Under the law of nations, states are 
obligated to make civil courts of justice accessible for claims 
of foreign subjects against individuals within the state’s 
                                                     
108   Id. at 5. 
109   Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, No. 12-CV-30051-MAP, 2013 WL 
4130756 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2013). 
110   Id. at *7. 
111  Id. at *13 (“[T]ortious acts committed by Defendant took place to a 
substantial degree within the United States.”). 
112  Id. at *14. 
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territory.113 
The court cited to an earlier opinion by a U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia judge in emphasizing that “[i]f the court’s 
decision constitutes a denial of justice, or if it appears to condone 
the original wrongful act, under the law of nations the United 
States would become responsible for the failure of its courts and be 
answerable not to the injured alien but to his home state.”114  The 
court also cited an event in the early history of the ATS, in which 
U.S. citizens who joined a French privateer fleet to aid the French 
in their war against Great Britain—despite an official American 
policy of neutrality—could be held civilly liable under ATS.  Since 
the issue could be resolved by way of a civil suit, this may have 
avoided an international conflict and diffused tensions between the 
United States and Great Britain. 115 
The analysis of the Sexual Minorities Uganda decision can be 
applied to U.S. corporations:  to further U.S. foreign policy interests 
such as the rule of law and the enforcement of human rights 
standards, U.S. corporate citizens should be held accountable when 
they violate U.S. and international law, in order to prevent 
negative foreign policy implications.116 
A number of other cases are pending, including Doe v. Exxon117 
and the above-mentioned Chiquita and Drummond appeals.118  
Another case in which there is a pending appeal is Mujica v. 
Occidental,119 in which plaintiff alleged that a bomb dropped by the 
                                                     
113  Id. 
114  Id. (quoting Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985)). 
115  Id. (citing Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 57 (1795)). 
116  The court specifically dismissed the reasoning in the Al Shimari case as 
“unpersuasive.”  See id. at *15 n.8 (“Arguably a different rationale may apply to a 
natural U.S. citizen than an American corporation.  If not, this court finds the 
reasoning in Al Shimari unpersuasive.”).  See also Ahmed v. Magan, 2:10-cv-00342, 
2013 WL 4479077 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 
2:10-cv-00342, 2013 WL 5493032 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2013) (holding there was no 
issue of extraterritoriality where defendant was a permanent resident of the 
United States).   
117  Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc 
dismissed (July 26, 2013) (affirming claims for wrongful death, assault and battery 
and negligent supervision and remanding ATS claims for further consideration). 
118  For more on these cases, see supra notes 33–37 (Chiquita), 89–91 
(Drummond), and accompanying text. 
119  Mujica v. Occidental, Nos. 10-55515, 1055516 & 10-55587 (pending in 9th 
Cir.).  Ninth Circuit oral argument was held on March 5, 2014.  See Oral 
Argument, Mujica v. Occidental (Nos. 10-55515, 1055516 & 10-55587), available at 
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military of Colombia killed his mother, sister, and cousin; he also 
alleges that the Colombian armed forces in question were funded 
by Occidental Petroleum Corporation, that the intelligence for the 
bombing was provided by Occidental, and that the bombing was 
planned in Occidental’s complex.120 
Several of these cases also raise questions beyond the issue of 
“extraterritoriality,” including debates over the standard of 
corporate complicity required to hold the defendants liable in U.S. 
courts.  The first post-Kiobel case to rule on this issue, Doe v. Nestle, 
found the correct standard to be that a company must have 
knowledge of the human rights abuse and continue to aid and abet 
the violation.121  In the Second Circuit, the courts are re-examining 
the circuit’s Kiobel ruling which held that corporations are not 
responsible under international law and therefore cannot be 
defendants in ATS cases.  As mentioned above, the Southern 
District of New York held that, inter alia, in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kiobel, corporations may in fact be sued under 
the ATS, but the Circuit itself has not yet addressed the issue.122 
As the above analysis indicates, there are still many unresolved 
questions and opportunities for plaintiffs to proceed with claims 
after the Kiobel ruling.  And, within the United States, there are 
other statutes which offer human rights victims possible remedies 
for plaintiffs besides the ATS.  
One additional federal statute which allows plaintiffs to raise 
                                                     
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pk_id=0000012431.  One issue  
in the Occidental case is the Supreme Court’s ruling  in  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 
No. 11-965 (Jan. 14, 2014), which held that a defendant was subject to general 
jurisdiction for ATS cases only if the defendant was “at home” within  the state.   
120  Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 (C.D. 
Cal. 2005).   
121  Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2013); Doe v. Nestle, 
S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2010), vacated sub nom.  I was counsel for 
amicus curiae Nuremberg Scholars in support of plaintiffs, who concluded that 
the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunals after the Second World War used a 
knowledge standard for aiding and abetting liability.  Brief of Amici Curiae 
Nuremberg Scholars et al. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants Seeking Reversal, at 
19–32, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-56739). 
122  In re South African Apartheid Litigation, supra note 98.  See also Jesner v. 
Arab Bank, PLC, No. 06-CV-3869(NG)(VVP), 2009 WL 4663865 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 
2009) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under the ATS, 
and, instead of addressing the extraterritoriality question, stating that the law of 
the Second Circuit was that plaintiffs could not bring claims against corporations 
under the ATS; the case is now on appeal to the Second Circuit, Jesner v. Arab 
Bank, No. 13-3605-cv (L)). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/6
06_GREEN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2014  11:09 AM 
2014] THE RULE OF LAW 1109 
human rights claims against multinational corporations is the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act.123  Under this statute, survivors 
of human trafficking may bring claims for the trafficking and other 
human rights abuses which are part of the trafficking, such as 
sexual violence or arbitrary detention, but the law is limited to 
provide remedies only to victims of trafficking.124  A statute 
providing opportunities for redress for acts of terrorism is the Anti-
Terrorism Act.125   
Another possible avenue for plaintiffs is to bring claims in state 
courts for torts such as wrongful death, assault and battery, and 
negligent supervision.  A number of plaintiffs in ATS cases have 
also brought state tort claims; one example where state claims are 
pending is Doe v. Exxon.126  
ATS cases, as well as the other U.S. federal and state laws 
which offer human rights victims the opportunity to bring claims 
for redress continue to contribute to the growing system of 
corporate human rights accountability. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In a time of increasing globalization of corporate activity, cases 
in the United States, as well as those in other national systems, 
have been important steps forward in a growing system of 
accountability for outlier corporations which violate human rights.  
Holding these violators accountable contributes to what has been 
called the “double bottom line”:  the bottom line of compliance 
with human rights standards as well as the traditional bottom line 
of maximizing financial profits.127 
The United States has a long tradition of passing and 
implementing laws designed to control corporate excess.  Parallel 
developments in the United States over the past century include 
the antitrust laws in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries128 and the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act in the 1970s.129  
                                                     
123  Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–12 (2012).   
124   Id.  
125  Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
126  Paul Hoffman and Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under 
State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9, 16 (2013). 
127  Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect 
Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 767 
(2009). 
128  Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012); Federal 
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These laws were passed to both punish and prevent violations and 
to create a fair system for law-abiding businesses.  Similarly, ATS 
suits seek to promote corporate social responsibility based on 
international human rights norms and reaffirm prohibitions such 
as those against forced labor, genocide, war crimes, torture, 
extrajudicial killing, and crimes against humanity, which are well-
established violations of international law. 
The burden on law-abiding businesses to avoid involvement in 
gross human rights abuses is similar to the burden of avoiding 
criminal or fraudulent conduct.  For example, the well-accepted 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants requires 
that, in order to avoid harsh sentences, companies must have 
rigorous due diligence programs to avoid involvement in criminal 
misconduct.130  Similarly, UN Guiding Principle 23(c) provides that 
companies should “[t]reat the risk of causing or contributing to 
gross human rights abuses as a legal compliance issue wherever 
they operate.”131 
In the Seventh Circuit decision in Flomo v. Firestone, Judge 
Posner noted that the ATS might level the playing field for ethical 
companies: 
One of the amicus curiae briefs argues, seemingly not 
tongue in cheek, that corporations shouldn’t be liable under 
the Alien Tort Statute because that would be bad for 
business.  That may seem both irrelevant and obvious; it is 
irrelevant, but not obvious.  Businesses in countries that 
have and enforce laws against child labor are hurt by 
competition from businesses that employ child labor in 
countries in which employing children is condoned. 132 
Nobel-Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has stressed that the 
ATS is an important means to improve business standards because 
it gives corporations an incentive to police their own conduct and 
to promote development and foreign direct investment.133  World 
                                                     
Trade Commission Act 1914, 15 U.S.C §§ 41-58 (2012); Sherman Act of 1890, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
129  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012). 
130  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2013), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2013_Guidelines/Manual_HTML/8b2_1.htm. 
131  Guiding Principles, supra note 1, ¶ 23(c). 
132 . Flomo v. Firestone Nat’l Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011). 
133  Brief of Joseph E. Stiglitz as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6, 
Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012) (No. 11-88).  
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Bank studies have shown that respect for human rights is 
associated with an economy’s performance.134 
The ATS is a limited statute, allowing plaintiffs to bring claims 
for the most egregious human rights violations.  Where 
corporations are complicit in those violations, liability rules 
provide carefully drawn standards for when plaintiffs can hold 
liable corporations and/or their officers.  The cases brought under 
the statute have drawn upon and contributed to the international 
standards intended to prevent and provide remedies for corporate 
human rights abuses. 
The ramifications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum are still unknown and the courts and parties 
in ATS cases face an important challenge:  will the nation’s 
pronouncements on the importance of human rights and the rule 
of law be applied to corporations who violate the most 
fundamental of human rights?  Will the courts contribute to a 
system of law which reins in the most egregious violations 
committed by corporate actors?   Or, will they contribute to a 
system of loopholes which allow corporations to argue that a 
corporation headquartered in the United States, doing business in 
the United States, benefitting from U.S. laws, or all of the above, 
should not have to comply with laws seeking to prevent and 
punish human rights violations?  
 
                                                     
134  Id. at 13 (citing Jonathan Isham, et al., Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the 
Performance of Government Projects, 11 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 219 (1997)). 
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